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1 INTRODUCTION
The common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)
regime proposed by the European Commission has the
potential to tackle most of the key issues of international
taxation. However, there is an inherent flaw in the design
of the CCCTB. The system does not remove the incentive
of Member States to engage in tax rate competition. On
the other hand, the CCCTB leaves multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) with the opportunity for tax minimization
through shifting of real activities. This article introduces
an amendment to the CCCTB that would tackle these
structural defects.
The CCCTB is based on a classic three-factor alloca-
tion formula that takes into account the location of
labour, (tangible) assets and sales. The approach pre-
sented in this article is to include in the formulary
apportionment system of the CCCTB an additional cal-
culation method, namely the destination-with-credit for-
mula. The starting point of the destination-with-credit
formula is to allocate all profits to the Member State(s)
of sales, as sales represents the least mobile factor of the
current apportionment key. However, unlike from some
previous proposals that concern a purely destination-
based approach, the destination-with-credit method
would be applied side-by-side with the three-factor base-
line formula. This is possible because under the destina-
tion-with-credit formula, the Member State(s) of sales
would be obligated to grant a computational credit for
foreign taxes paid based on the other attributes of the
baseline formula (labour and assets).
This article first explains the basic structure, merits and
flaws of the CCCTB proposal (section 2.), describes and
evaluates previously outlined solutions to the shortcom-
ings of the CCCTB (section 3.) and presents the destina-
tion-with-credit approach (section 4.).
2 THE CCCTB PROPOSAL
2.1 Basic Structure
The current international tax system applied in the
European Union is based on the standard separate entity
approach (arm’s length principle), under which each
Member State determines the scope of its tax jurisdiction
and applies its own tax base and tax rate. Instead, under
the CCCTB system, the profits (and losses) of different
units of an MNE are first calculated based on a uniform
tax base. Next, those profits (and losses) are consolidated
(added up). After that, the consolidated profits are allo-
cated to different Member States in line with a fixed
apportionment formula. Finally, each Member State
taxes its portion of the profits at its own tax rate.
The formulary apportionment mechanism of the CCCTB
is based on three equally weighted factors, namely sales,
labour and assets (the so-called Massachusetts formula).
Payroll costs count for half of the labour factor and the
number of employees for the other half. The assets factor
includes all tangible property of the MNE, but does not
include intangibles and financial assets.1 In technical terms
and with a little simplification, under the three-factor for-
mula, the corporate income tax of an MNE in a Member
State is calculated as follows:
Member State’s share of MNE’s EU-wide labour x
MNE’s EU-wide profit x 1/3
+
Member State’s share of MNE’s EU-wide assets x
MNE’s EU-wide profit x 1/3
+
Member State’s share of MNE’s EU-wide sales x
MNE’s EU-wide profit x 1/3
x
Member State’s corporate income tax rate (CIT rate)
Notes
* The author is a postdoctoral researcher at the Tampere University. This article was prepared at Tampere University’s Faculty of Management and Business with the funding
of the Academy of Finland under the ‘Transformation of the International Tax System’ research project [grant number 310747]. Email: martti.nieminen@tuni.fi.
1 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2016) 683 final 10 & 28 et seq. (25 Oct. 2016).
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2.2 Merits of the CCCTB
The CCCTB is the favoured alternative of the European
Commission to tackle the issues of the present interna-
tional business tax system. The CCCTB approach indeed
has various benefits compared to the current state of
affairs. First, the fast-paced technological developments
in communications, manufacturing and logistics are con-
centrating more and more taxable profits in the jurisdic-
tion where the intangibles of an MNE are located. The
CCCTB, with its three-factor apportionment formula, has
the benefit of restoring some of the balance in the alloca-
tion of taxing rights between different countries where an
MNE operates.
Also, under the CCCTB system, tremendously compli-
cated transfer pricing issues of today would be largely
avoided and MNEs would no longer have to deal with
twenty-eight different corporate tax bases. As a result,
compliance and administrative costs would be reduced. In
addition, double taxation, in particular economic double
taxation related to transfer pricing, as well as over-taxation
caused by lack of cross-border loss consolidation, would be
eliminated. Furthermore, the CCCTB would end tax base
competition between the Member States and remove from
the internal market opportunities for shifting of accounting
profits through intra-group transactions, as well as various
types of tax planning strategies that exploit differences in
national tax bases (e.g. hybrid instruments).2
2.3 Remaining Issues: Tax Rate Competition
and Shifting of Real Activities
Despite the broad coverage of the CCCTB regarding the
main problem areas of international business taxation,
some issues remain unaddressed. These are not minor
shortcomings, but indeed structural flaws that ultimately
could threaten the legitimacy of the entire system. Most
significantly, the CCCTB does not eliminate tax rate
competition between the Member States.3 The CCCTB
maintains the inbuilt incentive of the current system for
countries to apply a lower corporate income tax rate
compared to other countries in order to attract foreign
investment and to give domestic companies a competitive
advantage. Furthermore, one could argue that by remov-
ing the opportunities for Member States to engage in tax
base competition, the CCCTB could actually exacerbate
the so-called race to the bottom as regards statutory
corporate income tax rates.
The other side of tax rate competition is that the
CCCTB maintains the opportunity for MNEs to apply
tax planning strategies that exploit the differences in national
tax rates. Under the CCCTB, an MNE can achieve a lower
overall tax burden by manipulating the different factors in
the apportionment formula. This can be done by shifting
real activities (labour and tangible assets) to a low-taxing
Member State.4
Section 4 will demonstrate how the destination-with-
credit amendment would effectively reduce the incentive
of Member States to engage in tax rate competition and
the opportunities for MNEs to engage in factor shifting.
First, however, some previously presented solutions will
be considered, and their merits and shortcomings
evaluated.
3 PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
3.1 Minimum Corporate Tax Rate
One proposal to tackle tax rate competition and factor
shifting within the CCCTB is a minimum corporate
income tax rate.5 As such, a minimum tax rate would be
a somewhat efficient tool in this respect, as it would
moderate tax rate differences between the Member
States. However, the proposal comes with issues.
The effectiveness of a minimum tax rate is limited in
the sense that it does not entirely remove the incentive of
Member States to engage in tax competition and the
incentive of MNEs to engage in shifting of real activities.
As long as there is even one Member State with a corpo-
rate tax rate higher compared to the minimum tax rate,
MNEs have the incentive to optimize their tax position by
locating real activities in the lower-taxing Member States.
Conversely, any Member State that applies a higher cor-
porate tax rate has a competitive disadvantage in relation
to any Member State that applies a lower rate.
Accordingly, a system built on a minimum tax rate struc-
turally facilitates the harmonization of tax rates at the
level of the minimum rate. The race to the bottom con-
tinues until the minimum tax rate becomes the only tax
rate.
Notes
2 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document Proposals for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base and a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SWD(2016) 341 final 8 et seq. (25 Oct. 2016) and European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact
Assessment, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SEC(2011) 315 final 9 et seq. (16 Mar. 2011).
3 The conclusion of OECD’s 2018 tax policy study is that after a moderate period that followed the 2009 financial crisis corporate income tax rate reductions have again
accelerated over the last few years. OECD, Tax Policy Reforms 2018: OECD and Selected Partner Economies 68 (OECD Publishing 2018).
4 M.F. de Wilde, Sharing the Pie: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market 635 et seq. (IBFD 2017). Also, the location of ‘sales’ might be subject to manipulation in some cases.
However, this question can be addressed by careful designing of the applicable location rules. M.F de Wilde, Tax Competition Within the European Union Revisited: Is the
Relaunched CCCTB a Solution?, in The EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Critical Analysis 226 et seq. (D. Weber & J. van de Streek eds, Kluwer 2018).
5 E.g. European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (Rapporteur A. Lamassoure), Report on the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), A8-0051/2018 44 (1 Mar. 2018).
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All this is extremely problematic from the perspective
of the sovereignty of the Member States. As stated in the
Impact Assessment of the 2011 CCCTB proposal:
The comprehensive proposals examined in this docu-
ment do not imply a harmonisation of corporate tax
rates in the EU and, therefore, they do not restrict
Member States’ capability to influence their desired
amount of corporate tax revenues. They do not interfere
with national choices in terms of the size of public
sector’s intervention and composition of tax revenues.6
A regime with a uniform tax base and a minimum corpo-
rate tax rate would factually leave the Member States with
very little decision-making power concerning corporate
income taxation. Getting all Member States to agree on
such system does not seem very likely in the near future.
Accordingly, other options should be explored.
3.2 Destination-Based Formulary
Apportionment
One of the fundamental flaws of the present international
tax system is that states’ taxing rights are determined to a
large extent by the location of easily movable factors, in
particular the location of intangibles and financing. This
facilitates tax competition and aggressive tax planning.
Under the proposed CCCTB regime, this unsustainable
feature of the present system is moderated, but not
entirely removed. Under the apportionment key of the
CCCTB, two out of three apportionment factors, namely
labour and tangible assets, are still somewhat mobile,
although not equally agile compared to intangibles and
financial assets. What adds to the problem of tax compe-
tition under the CCCTB is that for the Member States,
the location of real activities (labour in particular) is not
just about corporate income tax revenue, but concerns a
whole range of other important considerations within and
outside taxation. Accordingly, tax rate competition in the
internal market can be expected to gain momentum, as
stakes are higher compared to the mere shifting of
accounting profits, which is the main concern today.
In order to cut the connection between corporate tax
revenues and mobile attributes altogether, it has been
proposed that the apportionment formula be entirely
based on the location of third-party sales.7 The underlying
idea is that the location of customers is something that
MNEs cannot manipulate.8
A purely destination-based formulary apportionment has
undeniable merits, in that it would successfully remove the
incentive of Member States to engage in tax rate competi-
tion and the incentive of MNEs to look for tax savings by
shifting real activities. Any such measures would be inef-
fective because the applicable tax rate would always be
determined by the location of sales. What is more, the
desired effect could be achieved without any harmonizing
of corporate tax rates within the internal market. There is,
however, at least one major concern regarding a purely
destination-based apportionment formula.
Allocating the taxing rights as regards an MNE entirely
to the Member State(s) where third-party sales take place
would fundamentally change the whole approach to the
attribution of MNE profits for income tax purposes.
Although the very basic idea of the CCCTB to apply a
formulary apportionment instead of the separate entity
approach already represents a structural shift in profit alloca-
tion, it still maintains the state of affairs in that taxing
powers are distributed between the state(s) of supply and
the state(s) of demand. In a purely destination-based
approach, the supply side of the value chain would be
altogether disregarded. For many, this may be a step too far.
4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: DESTINATION-
WITH-CREDIT FORMULARY
APPORTIONMENT
4.1 Basic Logic
This section introduces an alternative type of formulary
allocation that takes the positive from the purely destina-
tion-based apportionment discussed above (section 3.2.),
namely the connection between tax jurisdiction and the
relatively immovable location of third-party sales. At the
same time, the alternative approach avoids the negative
effect of the purely destination-based allocation method,
namely ignoring the taxing claim of the state(s) of supply.
This is achieved by applying a combination of the classic
three-factor (labour, assets, sales) Massachusetts formula
and a new destination-with-credit formula. The idea is
that the three-factor formula ensures the balanced alloca-
tion of taxing powers between the state(s) of supply and
state(s) of demand, while the destination-with-credit add-
on tackles the issues of tax competition and tax-motivated
shifting of real activities.
The formulary apportionment mechanism of the CCCTB
would be modified so that both the Massachusetts formula
Notes
6 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), supra n. 2, at 16.
7 R. S. Avi-Yonah & K. A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, Discussion Paper, Hamilton Project /
Brookings Institution (June 2007).
8 The proposal for Destination Based Cash Flow Tax is founded on the same basic logic. E.g. A. J. Auerbach, M. P. Devereux, M. Keen & J. Vella, Destination-Based Cash Flow
Taxation, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation WP 17/01 (Jan. 2017).
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and the destination-with-credit formula would be applied in
parallel. The amount of tax in each Member State would be
the greater of the results under the two competing formulas.
The outcome provided by such a combined approach is that in
a ‘normal’ situation, in which corporate income tax rates are
somewhat consistent and the allocation of labour and assets is
not concentrated in low-taxing Member State(s), the destina-
tion-with-credit add-on has little or no effect on the allocation
of the tax base between theMember States. Only when there is
a distortion in the form of significantly different corporate
income rates and a concentration of labour and assets in low-
taxing Member State(s), does the effect of the destination-
with-credit add-on become substantial.
In technical terms, the destination-with-credit formula
determines the amount of corporate income tax in a
Member State as follows:
Member State’s share of MNE’s EU-wide sales x
MNE’s EU-wide profit
x
Member State’s corporate income tax rate
-
credit for foreign taxes
The starting point under the destination-with-credit approach
is the same as in a purely destination-based formula. In
principle, all the profits of an MNE are allocated to the
Member State(s) of third-party sales. However – and this is
the main point of the destination-with-credit approach – the
Member State(s) of sales must allow a computational credit for
taxes paid in other Member State(s) based on the other factors
of the three-factor baseline formula, namely labour and assets.9
The outcome of such approach, in general terms, is that it
increases the amount of taxes in the State(s) of sales if there is a
major decrease in the tax rate in the State(s) of labour and/or
assets. The reason for this is that the decrease of taxes in the
State(s) of labour and/or assets decreases the computational
credit for foreign taxes in the State(s) of sales. As a result, the
destination-with-credit approach significantly reduces the
incentive for Member States to engage in tax rate competition
and the incentive for MNEs to minimize their taxes by
shifting real activities. Any tax savings acquired by locating
labour and/or assets in low-taxing Member State(s) will be
offset by the increase in taxes in the Member State(s) of sales.
The amount of credit for foreign taxes under the destina-
tion-with-credit approach is the lesser of the formulary credit or
the maximum credit. The formulary credit is the Member State’s
share of the MNE’s EU-wide sales times the MNE’s taxes
payable under labour and assets factors in other Member
States. The formulary credit is the essential and reflective
element of the destination-with-credit approach, as it increases
taxes in the State(s) of sales when taxes go down in the State(s)
of labour and/or assets. The maximum credit is the MNE’s taxes
payable in the Member State under the sales factor times two
thirds. The purpose of the maximum credit is to safeguard the
taxing rights of the State of sales when it applies a lower
corporate income tax rate compared to the State(s) of labour
and/or assets.10
4.2 Example of the Effects of the
Destination-with-Credit Approach
The following example illustrates the functioning of the
destination-with-credit add-on in a simple two-state sce-
nario (all figures are euro). Z Group operates in a higher-
taxing Member State (Germany) and in a lower-taxing
Member State (Poland). The overall EU-wide profit of Z
Group is 1 million. In the basic scenario, Z Group pays
the same total amount of taxes under the plain three-
factor Massachusetts approach and the proposed
Massachusetts + destination-with-credit approach.
Z GER
• 3 million labour
• 150 million assets
• 135 million sales
• CIT 30%
Z POL
• 5 million labour
• 50 million assets
• 65 million sales
• CIT 19%
4.2.1 Taxes in Germany
– Massachusetts formula: 600,000 x 30% = 180,00011
– labour 3/8 x 1 million x 1/3 = 125,000 x 30% =
37,500
Notes
9 Schreiber has previously discussed an approach in which MNEs profits, either on transactional level or on group level, are allocated on sales-basis and the sales jurisdictions
credit taxes levied on the share of MNEs profits attributed to non-sales jurisdictions. U. Schreiber, Sales-Based Apportionment of Profits, 72(4/5) Bull. Int’l Tax’n. 259–72
(2018). See also U. Schreiber & L. M. Fell, International Profit Allocation, Intangibles and Sales-Based Transactional Profit Split, 9(1) World Tax J. (2017). The main difference
between the destination-with-credit approach compared to the one discussed by Schreiber is that only the former approach is designed to operate particularly in the
formulary apportionment context. Therefore, only in the destination-with-credit approach the mechanism where profits are allocated on a sales-basis (with credit for foreign
taxes) is applied together with the three-factor apportionment formula (labour, assets and sales). In the context of the CCCTB, the Scientific Advisory Council of the German
Federal Ministry of Finance has suggested as a possible alternative to the formulary apportionment an approach that maintains the separate entity accounting principle and
includes a credit for taxes paid at subsidiary level. DE: Scientific Advisory Council, Federal Ministry of Finance, Einheitliche Bemessungsgrundlage der Körperschaftsteuer in der
Europäischen Union – Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen 27 (Mar. 2007), www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/
Standardartikel/Ministerium/Geschaeftsbereich/Wissenschaftlicher_Beirat/Gutachten_und_Stellungnahmen/Ausgewaehlte_Texte/0703231a3003.pdf?__blob=
publicationFile&v=5 (accessed 21 Jan. 2019). Schreiber has also discussed a similar alternative. U. Schreiber, Consolidation, Allocation and International Aspects, in A Common
Consolidated Tax Base for Europe – Eine einheitliche Körperschaftsteuerbemessungsgrundlage für Europa 113–27 (W. Schön, U. Schreiber & C. Spengel eds, Springer 2008).
10 Without the maximum credit, the application of the destination-with-credit formula could leave the state of sales entirely without tax revenue. This may happen in cases
where the state of sales applies a lower corporate income tax rate compared the state(s) of labour and/or assets and there is little or none labour and/or assets located in the
state of sales. In most cases, however, the applicable credit will be the formulary credit.
11 180,000 is the amount of taxes payable in Germany under the Massachusetts formula. That number is applied to Z Group as it is bigger than the amount of taxes payable in
Germany under the destination-with-credit formula (165,090).
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– assets 150/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 250,000 x 30% =
75,000
– sales 135/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 225,000 x 30% =
67,500
– destination-with-credit formula: 135/200 x 1 million =
675,000 x 30% = 202,50012 - 37,40013 = 165,090
– formulary credit: 135/200 x 55,41014 = 37,400
– maximum credit: 202,500 x 2/3 = 135,000
4.2.2 Taxes in Poland
– Massachusetts formula: 400,000 x 19% = 76,000
– labour 5/8 x 1 million x 1/3 = 208,330 x 19% =
39,580
– assets 50/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 83,330 x 19% =
15,830
– sales 65/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 108,330 x 19% =
20,580
– destination-with-credit formula: 65/200 x 1 million =
325,000 x 19% = 61,750 - 36,560 = 25,190
– formulary credit: 65/200 x 112,500 = 36,560
– maximum credit: 61,750 x 2/3 = 41,170
Total Taxes – Massachusetts only: 256,000 (25.60%)
Total Taxes – Massachusetts + destination-with-credit for-
mula: 256,000 (25.60%)15
Now Z Group attempts to obtain tax savings by placing
more assets in the lower-taxing Member State (Poland).
Under the plain Massachusetts approach, Z Group would
obtain substantial tax savings. However, under the com-
bined Massachusetts + destination-with-credit approach
the savings in total taxes is significantly reduced.
Z GER
• 3 million labour
• 50 million assets
• 135 million sales
• CIT 30%
Z POL
• 5 million labour
• 150 million assets
• 65 million sales
• CIT 19%
4.2.3 Taxes in Germany
– Massachusetts formula: 433,330 x 30% = 130,000
– labour 3/8 x 1 million x 1/3 = 125,000 x 30% =
37,500
– assets 50/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 83,330 x 30% =
25,000
– sales 135/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 225,000 x 30% =
67,500
– destination-with-credit formula: 135/200 x 1 million =
675,000 x 30% = 202,500 - 58,780 = 143,72016
– formulary credit: 135/200 x 87,080 = 58,780
– maximum credit: 202,500 x 2/3 = 135,000
4.2.4 Taxes in Poland
– Massachusetts formula: 566,670 x 19% = 107,670
– labour 5/8 x 1 million x 1/3 = 208,330 x 19% =
39,580
– assets 150/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 250,000 x 19% =
47,500
– sales 65/200 x 1 million x 1/3 = 108,330 x 19% =
20,580
– destination-with-credit formula: 65/200 x 1 million =
325,000 x 19% = 61,750 - 20,310 = 41,440
– formulary credit: 65/200 x 62,500 = 20,310
– maximum credit: 61,750 x 2/3 = 41,170
Total Taxes – Massachusetts only: 237,670 (23.77%)
Total Taxes – Massachusetts + destination-with-credit for-
mula: 251,390 (25.14%)17
4.3 Further Observations on the Effects
of the Destination-with-Credit Formula
As mentioned in section 4.1., in a normal situation where
corporate income tax rates are somewhat consistent and
the allocation of labour and assets is not concentrated in
low-taxing Member State(s), adding the destination-with-
credit approach to the CCCTB has little or no effect on
the allocation of the tax base between Member States and,
thus, on MNE’s total taxes. The reason for this is that
when corporate income tax rates are similar, the credit for
foreign taxes provided in the State(s) of sales always
remains relatively high. Only when there is a distortion
in the form of significantly different corporate income
rates and concentration of labour and assets in low-taxing
Member State(s), the effect of the destination-with-credit
add-on becomes substantial. The reason for this is that
when corporate income tax rates are dissimilar, the credit
for foreign taxes provided in the State(s) of sales may
Notes
12 202,500 is the amount of taxes that would be payable in Germany under a purely sales-based apportionment, i.e. without a credit mechanism.
13 37,400 is the formulary credit. In this example, the formulary credit is applied instead of the maximum credit, because the formulary credit is lesser of the two amounts.
14 55,410 is the amount of taxes payable in Poland under the labour and assets factors.
15 In this scenario, the amount of taxes payable under the destination-with-credit formula is lower than the amount of taxes payable under the Massachusetts formula in both
Germany and Poland. Therefore, the destination-with-credit add-on has no effect on Z Group’s total taxes.
16 143,720 is the amount of taxes payable in Germany under the destination-with-credit formula. That number is applied to Z Group as it is bigger than the amount of taxes
payable in Germany under the Massachusetts formula (130,000).
17 In this scenario, the amount of taxes payable under the destination-with-credit formula is greater than the amount of taxes payable under the Massachusetts formula in
Germany. Therefore, the destination-with-credit add-on increases Z Group’s total taxes.
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become relative low (or even zero if the applicable tax rate
in some of the other States is zero).
An example where Member States apply relatively simi-
lar corporate income tax rates is a three-state model where
the applicable tax rates are 18, 20 and 22%. In this
scenario, the destination-with-credit add-on has an effect
only in extreme cases where all or almost all labour and
assets are allocated to the lowest-taxing state(s). Even then,
the biggest difference between the plain Massachusetts
approach and the combined Massachusetts + destination-
with-credit approach with respect to an MNE’s lowest
possible overall tax rate is only approximately 2 percentage
points.
An example where Member States apply relatively
dissimilar corporate income tax rates is a three-state
model where the applicable tax rates are 10, 20 and
30%. In this scenario, the effect of the destination-
with-credit add-on is no longer limited to only the
extreme cases where all or almost all labour and assets
are allocated to the lowest taxing state(s). Yet, even in
this scenario the destination-with-credit add-on
remains with little or no effect if labour and assets are
allocated somewhat evenly or more to the higher-taxing
state(s). In this setting, the biggest difference between
the plain Massachusetts approach and the combined
Massachusetts + destination-with-credit approach with
respect to an MNE’s lowest possible overall tax rate is
increased to approximately 12 percentage points.
The destination-with-credit add-on would not prevent
the Member States from setting their own corporate tax
rates. For example there is nothing preventing a Member
State from applying a zero corporate income tax rate if it
wishes to do so in order to stimulate the economy or for
any other reason. What the destination-with-credit
approach simply does is that it moderates tax rate compe-
tition in the internal market by reducing the relative edge
of lower-taxing Member States. By doing so, one could
argue, the destination-with-credit approach actually
enhances the tax sovereignty of the Member States in
that it enables also the application of higher corporate
tax rates without the fear of losing investment to compe-
titor States simply because of tax rate differences.
5 CONCLUSION
Introducing the destination-with-credit add-on under the
CCCTB has the potential to significantly restrain tax compe-
tition and tax-motivated shifting of real activities, while
maintaining full capacity of the Member States to determine
their own corporate income tax rates. Implementing the
destination-with-credit amendment to the CCCTB would
be effortless, as it is simply a mathematical formula. No
additional information would need to be collected from tax-
payers compared to under the current three-factor formulary
approach.
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